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The Arctic Council at 15 Years:
Edging Forward in a Sea of Governance Challenges
DAVID L. VANDERZWAAG*
ABSTRACT: With the impacts of climate change on the Arctic, including the thinning and
decreasing extent of sea ice and projected dramatic increases in access to and development of
regional resources, the adequacy of existing governance arrangements for the Arctic is
increasingly being questioned. Through a two-part format, this article reviews how the Arctic
Council is faring as the key regional governance institution for the Arctic since being estab-
lished pursuant to a Declaration adopted by the eight Arctic States in September 1996. How
the Council has edged forward the regional cooperation agenda through its six working groups
and Ministerial meetings is first described. The recent governance innovation of establishing
task forces to negotiate regional instruments on search and rescue and emergency preparedness
and response is highlighted. The paper then turns to provide an overview of key challenges
confronting the Arctic Council: fully implementing existing commitments and recommenda-
tions; completing the Arctic Council's restructuring; addressing future governance of ocean
areas beyond national jurisdiction in the Arctic; and strengthening the 'Arctic voice' in
international fora.
KEYWORDS: arctic, regional cooperation, indigenous organisations, pollutants, ocean
governance, climate change
I. Introduction
Evolving from the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) which
focused on addressing pollutants and environmental protection in the Arctic,1 the
Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in Ocean Law and Governance and Professor, Marine & Environ-
mental Law Institute, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. The research support of the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) is gratefully acknowledged under the
research project, "Tracking and Envisioning the Future of Arctic Ocean Governance".
1 For discussions of the AEPS and its history, see David Va.nderZwa.ag/Rob Huebert/Stacey Ferrara,
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Arctic Council and Multilateral Environmental
Initiatives: Tinkering While the Arctic Marine Environment Totters, Denver Journal of International
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126084
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Arctic Council was established as a regional cooperation forum pursuant to a Decla-
ration adopted in Ottawa, September 1996.2 The Declaration set out an institutional
structure which remains largely intact today. The Council consists of eight Member
States,3 it is innovative by including indigenous organisations as Permanent Par-
ticipants,4 and also includes observers.5 The Council is charged with promoting
cooperation on common Arctic issues including issues of sustainable development,6
but security matters are excluded from the scope of the Council's mandate.7 The four
original working groups under the AEPS continued under the auspices of the Arctic
Council8 with two additional working groups subsequently added namely: the Sus-
tainable Development Working Group (SDWG),9 and the Arctic Contaminants
Action Program (ACAP).10 The Council has depended on voluntary financial and
Law and Policy 30 (2002), 131, 142-153; and Timo Koivurova, Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic
Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance, Polar Record 46 (2010), 146, 146-148.
2 Joint Communique and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 19 September
1996, reprinted in: ILM 35 (1996), 1382.
3 Members of the Council are: Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Rus-
sian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America.
4 Six indigenous organisations presently have permanent participant status: Aleut International
Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich' in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council,
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and the Saami Council, see Arctic
Council, Permanent Participants, available at: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/
permanentparticipants (accessed on 22 November 2011).
5 Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non-Arctic States, inter-governmental and inter-
parliamentary organisations, and non-governmental organisations, Arctic Council Declaration (note 2),
para. 3. Current observer States include: France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United
Kingdom, see Arctic Council, Non-Arctic States, available at: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.
php/en/about-us/partners-links (accessed on 22 November 2011).
6 Arctic Council Declaration (note 2), para. 1 (a).
7 Ibid., footnote 1.
8 They are: the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic
Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) and Emergency Pre-
vention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); ibid., para. 1 (b).
9 The SDWG, building upon an AEPS Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization, was
established in 1998, Iqaluit Declaration on the Occasion of the First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic
Council, Iqaluit, Canada, 17-18 September 1998, para. 9, available via: http://www.arctic-council.
org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/5-declarations# (accessed on 22 November 2011).
10 ACAP was formally endorsed as a working group at the October 2006 Ministerial meeting, Salek-
hard Declaration on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Arctic Council and the Fifth AC
Ministerial Meeting, 26 October 2006, Salekhard, Russia 6, available via: http://www.arctic-council.
org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/5-declarations# (accessed on 22 November 2011).
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human resource contributions from Member States for carrying out projects and
holding meetings.11
With accelerating thinning and loss of sea ice linked to climate change12 and
projected commercial developments on numerous fronts including oil and gas, ship-
ping, tourism and mining,13 the adequacy of the Arctic Council has come under
intensified scrutiny. Whether a 'soft law' regional forum largely dedicated to monitor-
ing the Arctic environment and undertaking projects and assessments is up to the
task of meeting the mounting challenges posed by climate change and globalisation
has been questioned by various scholars and non-governmental organisations.14
Numerous calls have been made for further strengthened Arctic cooperation through
one or more legally binding agreements with various options suggested.15 This in-
cludes a framework treaty formalising the existing Arctic Council arrangements,16 a
11 Koivurova (note 1), 148.
12 Scientific predictions as to when the Arctic Ocean may be ice-free in summer have varied, as early
as 2013 or as late as 2100, with one recent estimate being by 2030, U.S. National Snow and Ice Data
Center, Frequently Asked Questions about Arctic Sea Ice, available at: http://nsidc.org/arcticseaice
news/faq.html#really_declining (accessed on 22 November 2011); and The Guardian, 11 July 2011,
Arctic May Be Ice-Free Within 30 Years: Data Showing Dramatic Sea Ice Melt Suggests Warming at
North Pole Is Speeding Up, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/l 1/arctic-
ice-free?INTCMP=SRCH (accessed 22 November 2011).
13 Lawson W. Brigham, Thinking about the Arctic's Future: Scenarios for 2040, The Futurist
(September-October 2007), 27.
14 For views emphasising the need to fully implement existing international commitments rather than
developing a binding legal regime for the Arctic, see AlfHdkon Hoel, Do We Need a New Legal Regime
for the Arctic Ocean?, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 24 (2009), 443; Olav
Schram Stokke, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Idea of a Binding Regime for the Arctic Marine
Environment, Paper prepared for the 7th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Kiruna,
Sweden, 2-4 August 2006, available at: http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/oss-2006-arctic-parlamentarians.
pdf (accessed on 22 November 2011); Oran R. Young, Arctic Governance: Preparing for the Next Phase,
article commissioned by the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, June 2002,
available at: http://www.arcticparl.org/files/static/conf5_scpar2002.pdf (accessed on 22 November
2011).
15 For a review of options, see Linda Nowlan, Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection,
IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 44 (2001), 58.
1 Timo Koivurova, Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty — Evaluation and a new proposal, Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL) 17 (2008), 14.
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regional seas agreement with annexes or protocols,17 and even a multilateral agree-
ment dedicated to protecting the Arctic environment.18
A long list of reasons have been put forward for not 'disturbing the balance' too far
through excessive legalization. Those reasons include: the time-consuming nature of
diplomatic negotiations; the lack of ratification of existing agreements; the danger of
adopting lowest common denominator standards; the need to implement existing
international commitments as a first priority; and the concern over interfering with
the existing status of indigenous organisations as Permanent Participants.19
This paper takes stock of how the Arctic Council is faring as a governance institution
fifteen years after its establishment. Since a comprehensive analysis of the Council's
accomplishments during its first ten years already exists,20 this review largely focuses
on initiatives and developments within the last five years. Section II highlights how the
Arctic Council has edged forward with progressions on numerous fronts through its
six working groups and biennial ministerial meetings. Section III evaluates the key
challenges still confronting the Arctic Council: fully implementing existing commit-
ments and recommendations; completing the Arctic Council's restructuring; addressing
future ocean governance of areas beyond national jurisdiction in the Arctic and,
strengthening the 'Arctic voice' in international fora.
II. Edging Forward
The bulk of progressive activities of the Council has occurred through the Coun-
cil's six working groups while Ministerial meetings of the Council have served as key
decision-making venues where, for example, decisions have been reached to establish
17 Hans H, Hertell, Arctic Melt: The Tipping Point for an Arctic Treaty, Georgetown International
Environmental Law Review 21 (2009), 565.
18 Bonnie A. Malloy, On Thin Ice: How a Binding Treaty Regime Can Save the Arctic, Hastings
West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 16 (2010), 471.
19 David L, VanderZwaag, Climate Change and the Future of Arctic Governance: A Slushy
Seascape and Hard Questions, in: Timo Koivurova/E. Carina H. Keskitalo/Nigel Bankes (eds.), Cli-
mate Governance in the Arctic (2009), 403,416; Oran R. Young, If an Arctic Ocean Treaty Is Not the
Solution, What Is the Alternative?, Polar Record 47 (2011), 327, 332.
20 Timo Koivurova/DavidL. VanderZwaag, The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Pros-
pects, University of British Columbia Law Review 40 (2007), 121.
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task forces to negotiate regional agreements on 'search and rescue' and 'emergency
preparedness and response'.
A. Arctic Council Working Groups
/. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP)
The AMAP Working Group has been progressive in monitoring and assessing the
status, trends and risks of pollutants in the Arctic and has developed a typical assess-
ment approach of first issuing non-technical summary reports followed by more
detailed, fully-referenced scientific reports.21 Six summary reports, issued since the
2006 non-technical report on Arctic Acidification and Haze,22 provide an illustration
of AMAP assessment progressions and are briefly summarised here.
A 2011 mercury assessment report23 provides updated information on the levels
and sources of mercury in the Arctic and offers various policy recommendations.
About 100 tonnes of mercury are estimated to enter the Arctic Ocean from the air
each year with an additional 100 tonnes (approximately), thought to inflow, from the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, rivers and coastal erosion.24 Asian States, with China
and India being the highest emitters, are estimated to be responsible for 65 % of
global mercury emissions.25 The report issues a warning call on the possible effects of
climate change on the mercury cycle with increased releases arising from permafrost
thaws, ice melts and rising river discharges.26 The report notes that some Arctic biota,
especially marine top predators like polar bears, exhibit high levels of mercury in their
bodies which exceed thresholds for biological effects.27 In light of the scientific
findings, the 2011 assessment recommends, inter alia, that the Arctic Council should
21 Reports are available at: http://www.amap.no/Assessment/GeneralPublic.htm (accessed on 27 Oc-
tober 2011).
22 AMAP, Arctic Pollution 2006: Acidification and Arctic Haze (2006).
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continue supporting intergovernmental negotiations to develop a legally-binding
global instrument on mercury, and that health authorities develop culturally appro-
priate communication strategies concerning contaminants and human health.28
AMAP's Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) Assessment,29
also released in 2011, provides an update on climate change impacts on the Arctic
'cryosphere', that is, seasonally or perennially frozen areas.30 Key findings include: the
revelation that surface air temperatures in the Arctic since 2005 have been higher than
any five-year period since measurements began around 1880;31 multi-year sea ice,
mountain glaciers, ice caps and the Greenland Ice Sheet have all been declining faster
since 2000 than they did in the previous decade;32 the Arctic Ocean is projected to
become nearly ice-free in summer, likely within the next 30 to 40 years;33 and Arctic
infrastructure faces increased risks of damage due to changes in the cryosphere, particu-
larly the loss of permafrost and land-fast ice.34 Among the recommendations, the report
urges Arctic governments to develop and implement Arctic adaptation strategies and
Member States of the Arctic Council to increase their leadership in international
negotiations to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions as a matter of urgency.35
Building on previous AMAP assessments in 1997 and 2002,36 a 2009 'State of the
Arctic Environment Report' gave an updated picture on three areas: persistent organic
pollutants, human health and radioactivity.37 The assessment highlighted the need to
consider further international and national regulatory actions for groups of chemicals
accumulating in Arctic food webs including brominated flame retardants and
fluorinated compounds used as stain repellents and as non-stick surfaces in cookware.38
28 Ibid., iii.







36 AMAP, Arctic Pollution 2002 (2002) and AMAP, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Envi-
ronment Report (1997).
37 AMAP, Arctic Pollution 2009 (2009).
38 Ibid., 6-20.
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The report noted 65 high-production volume (> 100,000 tonnes per year) industrial
organic chemicals and pesticides may have the ability to biomagnify into Arctic
indigenous peoples' traditional foods.39 About 4,300 organic chemicals, most with low
or unknown production, are thought to have Arctic accumulation properties.40
The report also reviewed the risks and inputs of radioactivity from existing sources,
such as nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, nuclear power plants in the vicinity of the
Arctic, nuclear submarine decommissioning in the Russian Federation and radioiso-
tope thermoelectric generators (RTGs).41 The report summarised some of the numer-
ous international assistance efforts to help the Russian Federation to decommission
nuclear submarines, to better manage stored nuclear wastes and to dismantle existing
RTGs.42 Potential sources of radionuclides were highlighted including Russian plans
for developing floating nuclear power plants and technologically enhanced naturally
occurring radioactive materials (TENORM) from various industrial activities such as
mineral mining, oil and gas extractions, phosphate production and the use of geother-
mal energy.43 The assessment report recommended increased attention to TENORM
in future assessments and urged information to be provided from all countries en-
gaged in or planning Arctic oil and gas extraction and uranium or other mining.44
Two additional reports were also published by AMAP in 2009. The first was the
'Summary - The Greenland Ice Sheet in a Changing Climate'45 which emphasised
the worrisome rate of loss in the Greenland Ice Sheet with the annual loss of ice
between 1995 and 2000, averaging about 50 gigatonnes (Gt),46 and this transitioned
to a dramatically increasing average annual loss during 2003-2006 of about 160 Gt.47
The report was presented in December 2009 as an Arctic Council contribution to a
39 Ibid., 22.
40 Ibid.
41 RTGs are self-contained devices using radioactive decay to produce electricity for remote areas,




45 AMAP, Summary - The Greenland Ice Sheet in a Changing Climate: Snow, Water, Ice and
Permafrost in the Arctic (SW1PA) 2009 (2009).
46 A Gt = 1,000,000,000 tonnes. Ibid., 9.
47 Ibid.
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side event at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 15th
Conference of the Parties.48 The second report was the "Update on Selected Climate
Issues of Concern."49 It highlighted the substantial contributions of short-lived cli-
mate forcers, black carbon, methane and ozone to Arctic warming and suggested
mitigation options.50
AMAP's Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 report, finalised in 2008,51 provided an overview
of present and potential future impacts of oil and gas activities in the Arctic and the
likely course of hydrocarbon developments. Russia was identified as the dominant
Arctic producer of oil and gas with Russia possessing over 75 % of known Arctic oil
and over 90 % of known Arctic gas.52 An increase in oil and gas activity was projected
given that the Arctic contains an estimated quarter of the world's undiscovered oil
and gas.53 Among numerous recommendations, the report urged Arctic oil and gas
activities to be conducted in accordance with the precautionary approach and pol-
luter pays principle,54 and suggested that consideration be given to the need for
additional protected areas and areas closed for oil and gas activities.55
AMAP is in the process of preparing additional assessment reports for the Council's
next Ministerial meeting in 2013. AMAP expert groups are also assessing Arctic Ocean
acidification and short-lived climate forcers with a particular focus on tropospheric
ozone and methane.56
48 AMAP, Information on GRIS and the SWIPA Project, available at: http://amap.no/swipa/press
2009/GRJSContent.html (accessed on 27 October 2011).
49 AMAP, Update on Selected Climate Issues of Concern: Observations, Short-lived Climate
Forcers, Arctic Carbon Cycle, and Predictive Capability (2009).
50 Options include, among others: emissions controls on diesel engines and oil and gas flaring;
improvements in agricultural practices such as reduced burning; and capturing or eliminating methane
emissions from major industrial and waste treatment sources, ibid., 8.





56 AMAP, Work Plan for 2011-2013 with tentative deliverables in: Senior Arctic Officials (SAO)
Report to Ministers, Nuuk, Greenland (May 2011), 30,31, available at: http://www.arctic-council.org/
index.php/en/about/documents/category/20-main-documents-from-nuuk (accessed on 23 November
2011).
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2. Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP)
The ACAP Working Group has mainly focused on undertaking inventories and
pollution reduction and control projects in the Russian Federation.57 These projects
have been implemented through seven Project Steering Groups (PSGs).58 They
address areas of integrated hazardous waste management, environmentally-sound
management of obsolete and prohibited pesticides, reduction and elimination of
dioxin and furan releases, reduction of mercury releases, phasing out polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCB), the reduction and elimination of sources and releases of brominated
flame retardants, and local sources of contamination in indigenous communities.59
The project outcomes can be deduced from ACAP's report for the Senior Arctic
Officials (SAOs) which summarises main achievements from 2009 to 2011.60 Some
of the progress made include the improved storage of 6,500 tonnes of obsolete pesti-
cides in nine northern Russian priority districts directly impacting the Arctic,61 and
the completion in 2010 of a project in several Russian chlor-alkali facilities to reduce
mercury releases in wastewater and improve mercury monitoring systems.62 Further,
ACAP has identified the lack of facilities in Russia to destroy obsolete pesticide
stocks in an environmentally sound manner as a major limitation.63
In addition, ACAP in 2010 established a Project Steering Group on Short-lived
Climate Forcers. Initial activities are expected to focus on demonstration projects for
reducing Arctic black carbon emissions.64
57 The need to broaden activities to be more circumpolar in nature has been identified by ACAP as
a desirable future direction, see ACAP Report for 2009-2011 in: SAO Report, ibid., 9.
58 For a full listing and more detailed project descriptions, see ACAP, ACAP Projects, available at:
http://www.ac-acap.org/Page_project_eng.htm (accessed on 13 October 2011).
59 The Indigenous Peoples Contaminants Action Programme, having its Project Steering Group
terms of reference approved by ACAP in September 2010, is tasked with developing model demonstra-
tion projects addressing local sources of contamination in indigenous communities, ibid, and SAO
Report (note 56), 11.
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3. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF)
A comprehensive review of CAFF's monitoring assessment and conservation
activities is beyond the scope of this paper;65 nonetheless two main initiatives stand
out on the monitoring and assessment front. First, the Circumpolar Biodiversity
Monitoring Program (CBMP), endorsed by Arctic Council Ministers in 2004,66
continues to evolve as an international network of scientists and conservation experts
dedicated to harmonising and integrating efforts to monitor living resources in the
Arctic.67 Working through Expert Monitoring Groups, the CBMP is developing four
umbrella monitoring plans for marine, terrestrial, freshwater and coastal ecosystems.68
In addition, a Pan-Arctic Polar Bear Monitoring Plan is under development.69 In
April 2011, the Marine Expert Monitoring Group released the first of the four gen-
eral plans: the Arctic Marine Biodiversity Monitoring Plan.70 The Plan establishes
eight Arctic Marine Areas by which monitoring efforts and results will be organised,71
sets out a suite of biological parameters and indicators to be monitored,72 identifies
existing monitoring programs with contribution potential for the CBMP,73 and
includes a ten year implementation schedule and budget.74
65 For a detailed listing of CAFF initiatives, see CAFF Report, in: SAO Report (note 56), 14-19.
66 Reykjavik Declaration on the Occasion of the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,
24 November 2004, available at: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/
category/5-declarations (accessed on 23 November 2011).
67 CBMP, History of the CBMP, available at: http://caffportal.arcticportal.org/about-the-cbmp/
history-of-the-cbmp (accessed on 28 December 2011).
68 CBMP, e-CBMP Newsletter, Summer 2011, available at: http://www.caff.is/e-cbmp-newsletter
(accessed on 2 October 2011).
69 See Dag Vongraven/Etizabeth Peacock, Development of a Pan-Arctic Monitoring Plan for Polar
Bears: Background Paper, CAFF Monitoring Series Report No. 1 (January 2011).
70 Mike]. Gill et al, Arctic Marine Biodiversity Monitoring Plan, CAFF Monitoring Series Report
No. 3 (April 2011).
71 The eight areas are: Atlantic Arctic, Davis-Baffin, Hudson Complex, Arctic Archipelago, Beau-
fort, Pacific-Arctic, Kara-Laptev and Arctic Basin, ibid., 22.
72 Suggested parameters and indicators are set out for plankton, sea-ice biota, benthos, fish, seabirds
and marine mammals, ibid., 32-40.
73 Ibid., 41-47.
74 Ibid., Appendix A.
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region; and recommends that a systematic survey be undertaken of current and
projected HNS shipping in the Arctic.82
At the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting held in May 2011 the Working Group
was given a further task. Ministers called for the EPPR, in cooperation with other
relevant working groups, to develop recommendations and best practices for the
prevention of marine oil pollution and to submit preliminary or final results at the
next Ministerial meeting in 2013.83 During the EPPR Working Group meeting in
June 2011, a decision was reached to establish a Prevention Correspondence Group,
co-led by Norway and Canada, to convene a scoping workshop and to develop a
prevention project work plan.84
5. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME)
The PAME Working Group's most substantial strides forward relate to Arctic
shipping. Following a mandate set out in the Arctic Council's Arctic Marine Strategic
Plan,85 PAME undertook a comprehensive assessment of present and likely future
shipping activities in the Arctic. Consequently, the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping
Assessment (AMSA) report86 provided a detailed critique of the adequacy of applica-
ble international agreements and guidelines.87 The report made seventeen recommen-
dations organised under three themes for strengthening shipping governance. Under
the 'Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety' theme, AMSA recommended that Arctic States
should support the updating and mandatory application of relevant parts of the
82 Ibid., 95.
83 Nuuk Declaration on the Occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,
12 May 2011, Nuuk, Greenland, 4, available at: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/
documents/category/5-declarations (accessed on 23 November 2011).
84 EPPR Working Group MeetingFinal Report, Whitehorse, Yukon Canada, 15-l6June 2011,20,
available at: http://eppr.arctic-council.org/content/reports/EPPR-Working-Group-Meeting-Final-
Report%209-10-11 .pdf (accessed on 23 November 2011).
85 Para. 7.1.5 called for a comprehensive assessment of Arctic marine shipping at current and pro-
jected levels, Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, 24 November 2004, available at: http://
www.pame.is/arctic-marine-strategic-plan (accessed on 23 November 2011).
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Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters;88 augment global
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) ship safety and pollution prevention
conventions with specific mandatory requirements or other provisions aimed at
protecting the Arctic environment;89 consider possible harmonisation of national
shipping regulatory regimes;90 and develop and implement a multi-national Arctic
Search and Rescue (SAR) instrument.91 Under the second theme, "Protecting Arctic
People and the Environment," AMSA, among other things, urged Arctic States to
identify areas of heightened ecological and cultural significance and to implement
protective measures from the impacts of Arctic marine shipping;92 explore the need
for internationally designating areas of the Arctic Ocean for special environmental
protection (possibly through the IMO by the use of 'Special Area' or Particularly
Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) designations);93 and consider working with the IMO to
address shipping impacts on marine mammals through developing and implementing
mitigation strategies.94 Recommendations under the third theme, 'Building Arctic
Marine Infrastructure', included the need for Arctic States to improve Arctic marine
infrastructure;95 continue developing circumpolar environmental pollution response
capabilities (for example, through circumpolar or bilateral agreement(s));96 and in-
crease investments relating to the provision of hydrographic, meteorological and
oceanographic data for Arctic waters.97
The AMSA report might be described as a living document' as monitoring imple-
mentation of AMSA recommendations will be an ongoing part of the PAME agenda
with regular reports to Arctic Council Ministers. Therefore, many recommendations
88 Ibid., 6, Recom. I. B.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., Recom. I. C.
91 Ibid., Recom. I.E.
92 Ibid., 7, Recom. II. C.
93 Ibid., Recom. II. D.
94 Ibid., Recom. II. G.
95 Ibid., Recom. III. A.
96 Ibid., Recom. III. C.
97 Ibid., Recom. III. D.
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have already received substantial follow-ups.98 The IMO is in the process of develop-
ing a legally binding Polar Shipping Code." The five Arctic coastal States on 6 Octo-
ber 2010 established an Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission under the
auspices of the International Hydrographic Commission to promote enhanced
charting and routing in the Arctic region. 10° Further, under the leadership of Norway,
Russia and the United States, a FAME project is reviewing the risks associated with
the carriage of heavy fuel oil (HFO) in the Arctic and exploring ways for minimising
risks including the possibility of international regulations.101 Furthermore, the Sus-
tainable Development Working Group, AMAP and CAFF are cooperating in a study
of areas of heightened ecological and cultural significance in the Arctic.102 And in
May 2011, Arctic States adopted an Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic.103
PAME has also made advances in addressing land-based marine pollution and oil
and gas activities. In 2009 PAME completed a revision of the Regional Programme of
Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based Activ-
ities (RPA).104 The RPA reviews the status of nine pollution source categories in the
98 For a full review see Arctic Council, Status on Implementation of the AMSA 2009 Report Recom-
mendations, May 2011, available at: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/
category/26-pame-nuuk-ministerial (accessed on 23 November 2011).
99 In 2009 the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of IMO tasked its Design and Equipment Sub-
Committee with developing a mandatory code for ships operating in polar waters with a target comple-
tion date of 2012 and the IMO's Marine Environment Committee (MEPC) subsequently concurred in
the decision, see MSC, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee at Its Eighty-Sixth Session, MSC 86/
26 (12 June 2009), 111 and MEPC, Report of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee on Its
Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60/22 (12 April 2010), 104.
100 See Statutes of the Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission, 6 October 2010, available at:
http://www.iho.int/srvl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=435&Itemid=690
(accessed on 23 November 2011).
101 Arctic Council (note 98), 5.
102 Ibid., 8.
103 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic,
12 May 2011, available at: http://arctic-council.npolar.no/accms/export/sites/default/en/meetings/2011-
nuuk-ministerial/docs/ Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_fbr_signature_21-Apr-2011.pdf (accessed
on 23 November 2011).
104 Arctic Council, Regional Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environ-
ment from Land-based Activities, 29 April 2009, available at: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/
en/about/documents/category/62-pame (accessed on 23 November 2011).
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Arctic,105 ranks source categories as high, medium or low in priority for action,106 and
suggests specific measures for addressing the two highest priorities: persistent organic
pollutants107 and heavy metals.108
PAME also led the revision of Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (the Guide-
lines), adopted by the Arctic Council on 29 April 2009.109 The Guidelines encourage
regulators in the eight Arctic States to adopt common principles110 and practices in
managing oil and gas activities. The Guidelines encourage the application of environ-
mental assessment procedures with special consideration given to potential impacts
on indigenous ways of life and cultural heritage.111 The Guidelines suggest various
operating practices to control or prevent waste discharges, for example, the use of non
oil-based drilling fluids and zero discharge from wastes where feasible.112
A further PAME initiative, launched in 2009, holds particular promise to influ-
ence future strengthening in Arctic Ocean governance. PAME's Arctic Ocean Review
(AOR) project in Phase I, completed in 2011, produced a descriptive overview report
on the existing global and regional agreements and arrangements relevant to marine
environmental protection in the Arctic.113 Phase II of the AOR is expected to pro-
duce a final report to Arctic Council Ministers in 2013 with suggested options for
105 -j-jje njne categories are POPs, heavy metals, physical alteration and destruction of habitats, radio-
nuclides, petroleum hydrocarbons, sewage, nutrients, sediments and litter, ibid., 6-12.
106 pops and heavy metals are listed as high priorities while sewage, nutrients, sediments and litter
are listed as low, ibid.
107 For example, Arctic States are encouraged to ratify the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 24 June 1998, UNTS 2230,
79 (LRTAP POPs Protocol), and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 22 May
2001, UNTS 2256, 119, and to phase out certain POPs in addition to existing requirements under
international agreements, ibid., 14.
108 For example, Arctic States are encouraged to ratify the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Heavy Metals, 24 June 1998, UNTS 2237, 4 (LRTAP
Heavy Metals Protocol), and to cooperate in activities at the global level on mercury reduction, ibid.
109 Arctic Council, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, 29 April 2009, available at: http://
www.pame.is/offshore-oil-and-gas (assessed on 23 November 2011).
110 Key general principles include the precautionary approach, polluter pays, continuous improve-
ment and sustainable development, ibid., 6-7.
111 Ibid., 13.
112 Ibid., 31-33.
113 FAME, The Arctic Ocean Review: Phase I Report (2009-2011), 2011, available at: http://arctic-
council.npolar.no/en/meetings/2011-nuuk-ministerial/docs/ (accessed on 23 November 2011).
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enhancing global and regional agreements and measures for the management of the
Arctic marine environment.114 An AOR Expert Workshop, held in Reykjavik, Ice-
land, 20-21 September 2011, provided a venue for initial exploration of ideas to
advance cooperation in the areas of Arctic marine science, Arctic pollution sources,
living marine resource management, offshore oil and gas, and shipping.115
6. Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)
The SDWG carried out numerous projects and activities116 under six thematic
areas,117 but they largely focused on Arctic human health and socio-economic
issues.118 The SDWG in collaboration with the FAME Working Group undertook a
major policy-relevant project, "Best Practices in Ecosystem-based Oceans Manage-
ment in the Arctic," which was completed in 2009.119 The project produced a com-
prehensive report on indigenous perspectives and the practices of seven Arctic States
relating to ecosystem-based management.120 It also developed a summary document
on best practices in ecosystem-based ocean management in Arctic countries.121 The
114 Arctic Council, Arctic Ocean Review (AOR) Project 2009-2013, available at: http://www.aor.is/
index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=2&Itemid=3 (accessed on 23 No-
vember 2011).
115 The author was a participant.
116 For a chronological listing of SDWG projects and activities since 1996, see SDWG Work Plans
and Projects List, available at: http://portal.sdwg.org/content.php?doc=86 (accessed on 19 October
2011).
1" The themes are Arctic human health, Arctic socio-economic issues, adaptation to climate change,
energy and Arctic communities, management of natural resources, and Arctic cultures and languages,
SDWG Work Plan 2011-2013, in: SAO Report (note 56), 44.
118 For example, the Arctic Human Health Initiative, led by the United States and began as an
International Polar Year coordinating project for human health research, has continued with 28 projects
under its umbrella, SDWG, Arctic Human Health Initiative Report to the Arctic Council Ministerial,
April 2009, available at: http://portal.sdwg.org/content.php ?doc=77 (accessed on 23 November 2011).
119 AlfHakon Hoel (ed.), Best Practices in Ecosystem-based Oceans Management in the Arctic, Nor-
wegian Polar Institute Report No. 129 (2009).
120 Case studies included: Russia, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Denmark/Greenland, Canada and USA.
121 FAME, Observed Best Practices in Ecosystem-based Oceans Management in the Arctic Coun-
tries, available at: http://arcticportal.org/uploads/C8/gZ/C8gZgqLpt59hrMU2gJHpXQ/Dec-08.
flnal-draft-OBP-document—PAME-Nov-2008.pdf (accessed on 23 November 2011).
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report highlighted a major gap in existing ecosystem-based management, namely, the
lack of integrated planning in the transboundary context.122
The SDWG's Workplan for 2011 -2013 stands out for its limitations. Projects are
proposed under the themes of Arctic human health, socio-economic issues and Arctic
cultures and languages. However, no ongoingprojects are proposed under the themes
of adaptation to climate change, energy and Arctic communities, and management of
natural resources.123
At the Nuuk Ministerial meeting in May 2011, Arctic Council Ministers issued a
further assessment mandate to be taken up by the SDWG. Ministers called for an assess-
ment of the current state of human development on the Arctic and its relationship with
climate change and other factors affecting Arctic communities.124 The SDWG is in the
process of developing a project, Arctic Human Development II, to provide a circum-
polar assessment of human development and quality of life in the Arctic.125
B. Arctic Council Ministerial Meetings
For most of the Arctic Council's history, Ministerial meetings could be character-
ised as largely discussional and limited in law and policy impacts. Decisions were
dominated by approving working group workplans and projects and other recom-
mendations suggested by SAOs.126
At the Sixth Ministerial meeting in Troms0, Norway on 29 April 2009, a major shift
occurred with Ministers taking more of a policy-shaping role. Ministers decided to
establish a task force on short-lived climate forcers (SLCF) to identify measures to
reduce emissions and to recommend immediate response actions with a progress report
122 See e.g. the Canadian report and its highlighting the lack of integrated planning in the shared
marine waters of the Beaufort Sea (Canada-USA) and Baffin Bay and Davis Strait (Canada-Denmark/
Greenland), Robert Sinn/David VanderZwaag/Helen Fast, Ecosystem-based Ocean Management in the
Canadian Arctic, in: Hoel (note 119), 81.
123 SDWG Workplan (note 117), 45.
124 Nuuk Declaration (note 83), 2.
125 SDWG Work Plan (note 117), 46.
126 A common practice is for Working Groups to provide reports to SAOs and for SAOs to draw
many of their recommendations to Ministers from the submitted reports.
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requested for the next Ministerial meeting.127 The Ministers approved recommenda-
tions of the AMSA report, urged that parts of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in
Arctic Ice-covered Waters be made mandatory, and called for augmenting global IMO
ship safety and pollution conventions in order to better protect the Arctic environ-
ment.128 The greatest jump to a policy formation role was the decision to establish a
task force to develop and complete negotiation by the next Ministerial meeting in 2011
of an international instrument on cooperation in Arctic SAR operations.129
A task force under Arctic Council auspices subsequently negotiated an Arctic
Search and Rescue Agreement (the Agreement) which was signed during the Arctic
Council Ministerial meeting in Nuuk, Greenland on 12 May 2011.130 Besides delin-
eating regions of national SAR responsibility, the Agreement, among other things,
calls for carrying out joint SAR exercises and training, and facilitating expeditious
cooperative responses to SAR situations. Canada hosted the first gathering of SAR
specialists from the eight Arctic Council States for an Arctic SAR table top exercise,
5-6 October 2011 in Whitehorse, Yukon.
Also at the Seventh Ministerial meeting in Nuuk, Greenland on 12 May 2011, Min-
isters welcomed reports on SLCF and encouraged Arctic States to implement at the
national level relevant recommendations for reducing emissions of black carbon.131
Ministers also decided to establish a Short-Lived Climate Forcer Contaminants
project steering group to undertake circumpolar demonstrative projects to reduce
black carbon and other SLCF emissions.132 Ministers further advanced the Council's
governance shaping role by deciding to establish a task force to develop an interna-
tional instrument on Arctic marine oil pollution preparedness and response.133
127 Tromso Declaration on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,
29 April 2009, Tromso, Norway, 3, available at: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/
documents/category/ 5-declarations (accessed on 23 November 2011). An initial report was subsequently
published: Technical Report of the Arctic Council Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers, An
Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Options for Black Carbon for the Arctic Council, May 2011,
available at: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/7-working-groups-
scientific-reportsassessments (accessed on 23 November 2011).
128 Tromso Declaration (note 127), 4.
129 Ibid., 5.
130 Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (note 103).
131 Nuuk Declaration (note 83), 3.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., 4.
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III. Sea of Challenges
The key challenges facing the Arctic Council as it voyages beyond its first fifteen
years may be largely summarised under four headings. They include: fully implement-
ing existing commitments and recommendations; completing the Arctic Council's
restructuring; addressing future governance of Arctic areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion; and strengthening the 'Arctic voice' in international fora.
A. Fully Implementing Existing Commitments and Recommendations
Getting a firm grip on how the numerous commitments and recommendations
flowing from Arctic Council Ministerial meetings and reports have been imple-
mented is difficult since the Council has not generally required national reporting or
project follow-up monitoring.134 For example, although the Regional Programme of
Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based
Activities recommended the development of a reporting procedure and format for
assessing RPA implementation and effectiveness,135 no national reporting system has
been created. Nevertheless, various implementation challenges stand out with three
of them reviewed below.
1. Getting Full Ratification of International Agreements
While various encouragements have been given to Arctic States to sign and ratify
key international agreements, implementation remains a challenge. For example, the
RPA urges Arctic States to ratify the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants (POPs) and the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air
Pollution (LRTAP) Protocols on POPs and heavy metals.136 However, the United
134 The exception standing out is the AMSA report where review is ongoing, see supra, note 98.
135 RPA (note 104), 16.
136 Ibid., 14. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on
Persistent Organic Pollutants (note 107) and Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution on Heavy Metals (note 108).
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States have not ratified the Stockholm Convention;137 the Russian Federation and
USA are not parties to the LRTAP POPs Protocol138 and Iceland and the Russian
Federation are not parties to the Heavy Metals Protocol.139
Ratification of the International Convention for the Control and Management of
Ships Ballast Water and Sediments140 was one of the key recommendations of the
AMSA report,141 but implementation has been slow. Only Canada, Norway and
Sweden have ratified the Convention.142 National reasons for the lack of ratifications
are too diverse to elaborate in this article.
2. Following Through with AMSA Recommendations
While considerable progress in implementing AMSA recommendations has
occurred since the report was published in 2009,143 many 'unfinished agendas' remain.
For example, the AMSA Implementation Status Report of May 2011 noted that more
work needs to be done to identify and protect areas of heightened ecological and
culture significance within the Arctic. Further, sharing Arctic maritime domain
awareness information on positions and movements of ships should be enhanced
137 The Russian Federation ratified the Convention on 17 August 2011 and it will enter into force
for the Federation on 15 November 2011 (this statement was correct at the time of writing, and at the
time of going to press the Stockholm Convention entered into force for Russia). Denmark has ratified
but with a territorial exclusion of Faroe Islands and Greenland. Stockholm Convention status of
ratification is available at: http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
XXVII-15&chapter=27&lang=en (accessed on 23 November 2011).
138 LRTAP POPs Protocol status of ratification is available at: http://treaties.un.org/pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-l-g&chapter=27&lang=en (accessed on 23 November
2011).
139 LRTAP Heavy Metals Protocol status of ratification is available at: http://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetaus.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVn-l-f&chapter=278dang=en (accessed on 23 No-
vember 2011).
140 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sedi-
ments, 23 February 2004, IMO Doc. BWM/CONF/36 Annex.
141 AMSA (note 86), 7, Recom. II. E.
142 As of 30 September 2011, IMO, Status of Conventions, available at: http://www.imo.org/
About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed on 23 November 2011).
143 Arctic Council (note 98).
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among Arctic Council member governments.144 More effort to ensure adequate spill
response capacity across the Arctic was also identified as a further item for attention.145
A priority challenge is the completion of negotiations towards an effective Polar
Shipping Code (the Code). However, numerous issues remain to be resolved regarding
its contents. They include: types of vessels to be covered such as possible extension to
fishing vessels; the appropriate balance between mandatory and recommendatory pro-
visions; the inclusion of ice navigational training requirements; vessel-source pollution
discharge standards; and voyage planning requirements, such as possible pairing of ships
to assist potential search and rescue.146 In July 2011, a Working Group Report on the
development of a mandatory Polar Shipping Code to the IMO's Sub-Committee on
Ship Design and Equipment (DE) noted the lack of final agreement for the various
draft chapters of the Code.147 The inclusion of an environmental chapter within the
Code has become particularly controversial with an IMO Workshop held from 27-
30 September 2011 to discuss environmental aspects of the Code.148
A further complication is resolving how to make the Code mandatory with three
main possible options: adopting the Code as an amendment to the SOLAS Conven-
tion;149 developing amendments to SOLAS, MARPOL,150 the Anti-fouling Systems
Convention151 and the Ballast Water Management Convention;152 and creating a
new convention on polar shipping.153 The IMO Subcommittee on Ship Design and
144 Ibid., 3.
145 Ibid.
146 See IMO Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, Comments on the Report of the
Correspondence Group on the Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar
Waters, Submitted by Denmark, IMO Doc. DE 55/12/15 (31 January 2011).
147 IMO Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, Report of the Working Group (Part 2),
Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, IMO Doc. DE 56/10 (7 July
2011), para. 6.
148 See IMO, Circular Letter No. 3201/Add. 1,24 August 2011.
149 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November 1974, UNTS 1184,3.
150 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, UNTS
1340,184.
151 International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships, 5 October
2001, IMO Doc. AFS/CONF/26 Annex.
152 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sedi-
ments (note 140).
153 IMO Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, Outcome of DE 55 - Legal Opinion on
Making the Polar Code Mandatory, IMO Doc. MEPC 62/11/14. Add 1 (6May2011).
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Equipment (DE) has re-established the Correspondence Group on Development of
a Mandatory Code under the co-ordination of Norway to further develop the Code
with a report to be submitted to the 56th session of the DE Sub-Committee.154
The target completion date of 2012 for the Polar Shipping Code negotiations
seems unlikely to be met in light of the numerous issues to be resolved. Arctic Coun-
cil Ministers in the Nuuk Declaration in 2011 already emphasised the need for timely
completion of the Polar Code.155 The PAME Working Group in its meeting in
September 2011 recommended that member governments consider the submission
of a paper to the IMO, which emphasizes the importance of the completion of the
Polar Code to Arctic Council Member States.156
Reducing air emissions from ships, also an AMSA recommendation157 remains a
'work in progress'. Although the IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee
(MEPC) at its 62nd session in July 2011 adopted new regulations on energy effi-
ciency for ships,158 sorting out further commitments on reducing greenhouse gas
emissions from ships remains. Challenges such as market-based measures and possible
setting of emission caps and reduction targets are to be considered further at the
MEPC's 63rd session.159 The MEPC has also tasked the Bulk Liquids and Gases
(BLG) Sub-Committee with investigating appropriate control measures to reduce the
impacts of black carbon emissions from international shipping and to submit a final
report at the MEPC's 65th session.160
In order to ensure compliance on the AMSA recommendation, shipping-related
infrastructure in the Arctic needs to be improved by Arctic States. This stands out as
a difficult challenge given the long list of infrastructure deficits identified,161 and
concurrently with the need for major national financial and human resource commit-
154 DE Sub-Committee Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO Doc. DE55/22 (15 April
2011), 28-29.
155 Nuuk Declaration (note 83), 4.
156 PAME, Record of Decisions and Follow-Up Actions PAME 11-2011 (21-23 September 2011), 1.
157 AMSA (note 86), 7, Recom. II. H.
158 See MEPC, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its Sixty-Second
Session, IMO Doc. MEPC 62/24 (26 July 2011), Annex 19.
159 Ibid., paras. 5.44 and 5.46.
160 Ibid., para. 4.20.
161 AMSA (note 86), 7, Recom. III. A.
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ments.162 Shipping infrastructure is clearly more advanced in the Barents Sea and
Northern Sea Route regions than in other areas of the Arctic.163
3. Putting the Ecosystem Approach into Practice
While the Arctic Council's Arctic Marine Strategic Plan highlights an ecosystem
approach as a way forward in managing the Arctic marine environment,164 subsequent
Council activities relating to the ecosystem approach might be described as largely
'conceptual and informative'. The Council's project on "Best Practices in Ecosystem-
based Management in the Arctic" developed a list of core elements essential to
implementing the ecosystem-based management concept.165 The PAME Working
Group has established an Ecosystem Approach Expert Group. They held a workshop
in January 2011, which discussed possible revisions to an existing map of seventeen
Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) in the Arctic and collected information on the
numerous assessments already being carried out in the LMEs.166 The Ecosystem
Approach Expert Group is expected to plan the further development of ecosystem
status reports for the various LMEs. This will help identify possible ways to better
integrate existing national and international monitoring and assessment programmes
and to contribute to the revision of the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan in light of the
ecosystem approach expertise.167
162 For a recent lament over limited infrastructure in the Arctic, see Lawson Brigham, Marine Pro-
tection in the Arctic Cannot Wait, Nature 478 (2011), 157.
163 See, e.g., AMSA (note 86), 5, andMiaBennett, The Northwest Passage Versus the Northern Sea
Route (19 August 2011), available at: http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/108/19/the-northwest-
passage-versus-northern-sea-route/ (accessed on 26 August 2011).
164 Arctic Council (note 85), para. 7.4.
165 Some core elements include: the application of the best available scientific and other knowledge
to understand ecosystem interactions and to manage human activities; an integrated and multi-disciplinary
approach to management that takes into account the entire ecosystem; the assessment of cumulative
impacts; setting explicit conservation standards, targets and indicators; and enhancing transboundary
arrangements, PAME (note 121), 1-2.
166 PAME, Report from the PAME Workshop on Ecosystem Approach to Management, 22—23 Janu-
ary 2011, Tromso, Norway, available at: http://arctic-council.npolar.no/en/meetings/2011-nuuk-
ministerial/docs/ (accessed on 23 November 2011).
167 PAME, PAME Work Plan 2011-2013, 7, available at: http://arctic-council.npolar.no/en/
meetings/2011-nuuk-ministerial/docs/ (accessed on 23 November 2011).
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However, ways in which the ecosystem approach will be further advanced within
the Arctic Council remains uncertain. Arctic Ministers at the Ministerial meeting in
May 2011 decided to establish an expert group on Arctic ecosystem-based manage-
ment for the Arctic environment. It has been mandated to recommend further
activities in that field for possible consideration by the SAOs before the end of the
Swedish chairmanship.168 How the new experts group and the PAME Expert Group
will interact is unclear, as they have overlapping interests. The International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), an observer to the Arctic Council, has collaborated
with the Natural Resources Defense Council in hosting three workshops on
ecosystem-based management in the Arctic marine environment. They have suggested,
among others things, the possible development of an Arctic Marine Ecosystem-based
Management Strategy by the Council,169 and identified ecologically and biologically
significant areas (EBSAs) in the Arctic which may warrant special protection.170
Navigating from high level discussions and assessments to concrete management
commitments and measures in light of ecosystem-based management is likely to be
incremental. Establishment of a network of marine protected areas in the Arctic and
development of integrated management planning in the LME and transboundary
contexts stand out as unmet challenges.171
B. Completing the Arctic Council's Restructuring
While the issue of the Arctic Council's efficiency and effectiveness has been in the
Arctic Council's agenda since Norway chaired the Council from 2006-2009, prog-
168 Nuuk Declaration (note 83), 4.
169 IUCN/NRDC, IUCN/NRDC Workshop on Ecosystem-based Management in the Arctic
Marine Environment Workshop Report, 16-18 June 2010, Washington, D.C., available at: http://
cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/arctic_workshop_report_final.pdf (accessed on 23 November 2011).
170 IUCN/NRDC, IUCN/NRDC Workshop to Identify Areas of Ecological and Biological Signifi-
cance or Vulnerability in the Arctic Marine Environment, Workshop Report, 2-4 November 2010, La
Jolla, CA, available at: http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/Rep-2011-00l.pdf (accessed on 23 No-
vember 2011).
171 While the CAFF Working Group has provided useful maps identifying protected areas in the
Arctic, CAFF has not been successful in developing a circumpolar protected areas network (CPAN) and
a CPAN programme is currently listed as dormant, see Arctic Council, CAFF — Conservation of Arctic
Flora and Fauna, available at: http://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/caff (accessed on 28 October
2011).
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ress in making changes in the administration and organisation of the Council has
been slow.172 Through the Tromso Declaration in 2009, Ministers as a small step
forward decided to further strengthen the political role of the Council by having
deputy minister level meetings, with representatives of Permanent Participants, to
discuss emerging issues between Ministerial meetings.173 Ministers called for further
consideration of how the Arctic Council should be best structured and for continued
discussions on the role of observers in the Arctic Council.174 Ministers also decided to
develop guidelines for engagement in outreach activities and an Arctic Council com-
munication and outreach plan.175
A breakthrough occurred at the Nuuk Ministerial meeting in May 2011 where key
steps towards strengthening the Arctic Council occurred. Ministers decided to establish
a Standing Arctic Council Secretariat in Tromso, Norway, to be operational no later
than the beginning of the Canadian chairmanship of the Council in 2013.176 Ministers
also decided to establish a task force to implement decisions to strengthen the Arctic
Council including necessary arrangements for the Secretariat and approved the terms
of reference for the task force as set out in the SAO Report to Ministers in 2011.177 The
SAO Report included an annex, "Framework for Strengthening the Arctic Council,"
which partly focused on providing details regarding the proposed secretariat. A key
commitment was to provide an administrative budget to cover the operating costs of
the secretariat with the budget to be determined at the Ministerial meeting every
second year and the budget financing to be equally shared by the eight Arctic States
in an amount which should not exceed US $ 1 million.178 The Framework also indi-
cated that the Arctic Council would utilise a wide range of approaches to address
172 See Koivurova (note 1), 152-153.
173 Troms0 Declaration (note 127), 8.
1 Ibid., 9. The addition of farther observers has become controversial with requests for permanent
observer status by the EU, China, Italy, and South Korea being denied in 2009 pending farther discus-
sions within the Arctic Council on how to address the criteria for observers, see EU Observer, 30 April
2009, Arctic Council Rejects EU Observer Application, available at: http://euobserver.com/885/28043
(accessed on 31 October 2011).
175 Tromso Declaration (note 127), 9.
176 Nuuk Declaration (note 83), 2.
177 Ibid.
178 SAO Report (note 56), Annex 1,49.
306 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-2011
emerging challenges in the Arctic, including scientific assessments, guidelines, best
practices, new legally binding instruments, and an increased use of task forces.179
In Nuuk, Ministers also adopted recommendations of SAOs on the role and
criteria for observers to the Arctic Council and decided to apply the criteria to evalu-
ate pending applicants for observer status.180 The criteria by which observer suitability
is to be determined by the Council include the extent to which observers:
- accept and support the objectives of the Arctic Council defined in the Ottawa
declaration,
- recognise Arctic States' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the
Arctic,
- recognise that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including,
notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation
for responsible management of this ocean,
- respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples
and other Arctic inhabitants,
- have demonstrated a political willingness as well as financial ability to contrib-
ute to the work of the Permanent Participants and other Arctic indigenous
peoples,
- have demonstrated their Arctic interests and expertise relevant to the work of
the Arctic Council, and
- have demonstrated a concrete interest and ability to support the work of the Arc-
tic Council, including through partnerships with Member States and Permanent
Participants bringing Arctic concerns to global decision making bodies.181
The role of observers is also clarified. For example, observers may submit written
statements at Ministerial meetings and at meetings of the Council's subsidiary bodies
observers may, at the discretion of the Chair, make statements after Arctic States and
Permanent Participants, present written statements and submit relevant documents.
Observers may propose projects through an Arctic State or a Permanent Participant
179 Ibid., 49-50.
180 Nuuk Declaration (note 83), 2.
181 SAO Report (note 56), Annex 1,50.
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but financial contributions from observers to any given project may not exceed the
financing from Arctic States, unless otherwise decided by SAOs.182
A final strengthening component adopted by Ministers in Nuuk related to Arctic
Council communications. Ministers adopted Communication and Outreach Guide-
lines and instructed SAOs to develop a Strategic Communications Plan for the
Council.183
While the Arctic Council's structural transitionings in process offer hope for a
more effective Council, other challenges loom on the horizon. Whether the Indige-
nous Peoples Secretariat should be integrated with the permanent Arctic Council
Secretariat is under review by Permanent Participants and it remains to be seen how
services to Permanent Participant organisations might be strengthened.184
By far the biggest challenge may be ensuring adequate financing for Arctic Council
assessments and projects and other activities.185 The new budgetary expenditures
being proposed for covering the Arctic Council are limited to secretariat costs.186 The
Nuuk Declaration itself highlighted the continuing financial limitations of the Coun-
cil. Ministers reiterated:
[t]he need to finance circumpolar cooperation, as well as the importance of providing
adequate funding to Permanent Participants to support their preparations for, and partici-
pation in, the Arctic Council, the working groups, task forces and Arctic Council
projects.187
The suggestions for ways in which the Arctic Council can be strengthened, offered
by various groups and authors, have not been followed. Suggestions have included:
182 Ibid., 50-51.
183 Nuuk Declaration (note 83), 2.
184 SAO Report (note 56), Annex 1,49.
185 A Project Support Instrument (PSI), managed by the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation
(NEFCO), has been launched to support Arctic Council projects but since priority is to be given to
projects related to pollution prevention, abatement and elimination, it appears likely most funding will
be directed towards Russian clean-up and pollution reduction projects, see NEFCO, PSI Status, AC AP
Working Group Meeting, Ottawa, Canada, 16-18 September 2009, available at: http://www.ac-acap.org/
WGM%2016-18.09.09%20Ottawa.htm (accessed on 23 November 2011); The Voice of Russia, 5 Oc-
tober 2011, Russia Gives 10 mln Euros for Arctic Clean-Up, available at: http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/10/
05/58195725.html (accessed on 11 October 2011).
186 SAO Report (note 56), 49.
187 Nuuk Declaration (note 83), 6.
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holding one or more Ministerial meetings at the head of State level,188 reforming the
Council's mandate to include security and education,189 restructuring the working
groups,190 and creating a category of consultative party status to enhance the role of
leading non-State actors and to encourage them to contribute to an Arctic Fund.191
C. Addressing Future Ocean Governance of Areas
Beyond National Jurisdiction in the Arctic
Another pressing challenge is the need to consider future directions for governance
arrangements in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) beyond national jurisdiction. A
large high seas 'donut hole' exists in the CAO beyond the 200 nm zones of coastal
States and at least two deep seabed areas have been predicted to lie beyond national
jurisdiction once the Arctic coastal States delimit the outer extent of their continen-
tal shelves.192
Multiplicities of future governance proposals have emanated from academics, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and others. Suggestions include: establishment
of a regional fisheries management organisation;193 possible expansion of the fisheries
188 The Arctic Governance Project, Arctic Governance in an Era of Transformative Change: Critical
Questions, Governance Principles, Ways Forward, Report of the Arctic Governance Project, 14 April
2010,18, available at: http://img9.custompublish.com/getfile.php/1219555.1529.wyaufxvxuc/AGP+
Report+April+14+2010%5Bl%5D.pdf?return=arcticgovernance.custompublish.com (accessed on 23 No-
vember 2011).
189 Ibid., 17.
190 For example, merging working groups with environmental action roles, specifically FAME,
ACAP and EPPR and part of CAFF, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Improving the Efficiency and Effec-
tiveness of the Arctic Council: A Discussion Paper, March 2007,8, available at: http://arcticgovernance.
custompublish.com/improving-the-efficiency-and-effectiveness-of-the-arctic-council-a-discussion-
paper.4640516-l42902.html (accessed on 23 November 2011).
191 Franklyn Griffiths, Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy, Foreign Policy for Canada's Tomorrow
No. 1, Canadian International Council, May 2009, 16, available at: http://2030north.carc.org/docs/
Session%205%20-%20Canadian%20Arctic%20Strategy%20Paper%20-%20Griffiths.pdf (accessed on
23 November 2011).
192 See Ran Macnab, Outer Continental Shelves in the Arctic Ocean: Sovereign Rights and Inter-
national Cooperation, Meridian (Spring/Summer 2006) 1, 2. Regarding the legal complexities and
uncertainties relating to continental shelf extensions see Alexander Proelss/TillMuller, The Legal Regime
of the Arctic Ocean, Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 68 (2008), 651.
193 See Rob Huebert/Brooks B. Yeager, A New Sea: The Need for a Regional Agreement on Manage-
ment of the Arctic Marine Environment, WWF International Arctic Programme (2008), 33.
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jurisdiction of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission;194 creation of a re-
gional ocean management organisation;195 adoption of an Arctic Ocean framework
convention applicable to the Arctic marine environment both within and beyond
national jurisdictions;196 a regional suigeneris approach whereby the five coastal States
would divide the area beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) into national sections;197
and a freeze on jurisdictional claims to the central Arctic basin.198
While the Arctic Council has not specifically addressed the topic of ABNJ gover-
nance, representatives of the five Arctic coastal States did tangentially consider future
directions in governance at their meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland in May 2008. They
indicated that the Law of the Sea199 provides a solid foundation for responsible
management by the five coastal States and other users of the Arctic Ocean.200 Under
a Law of the Sea approach, various freedoms would be open to all States including the
freedoms of navigation and fishing.201 Mineral exploration and exploitation of the
deep seabed would come under the jurisdiction of the International Seabed Author-
ity.202 Flag State jurisdiction would prevail as the prime principle for controlling
194 For a discussion of the option and its unlikely feasibility see Timo Koivurova/ErikJ. Molenaar/
DavidL. VanderZwaag, Canada, the European Union, and Arctic Ocean Governance: A Tangled and
Shirting Seascape and Future Directions, in: Timo Koivurova etal. (eds.), Understanding and Strength-
ening European Union - Canada Relations in Law of the Sea and Ocean Governance (2009), 107,
137-141.
195 See Rosemary Ray/use, Protecting Marine Biodiversity in Polar Areas Beyond National Jurisdic-
tion, RECIEL 17 (2008) 3,11; and id., Melting Moments: The Future of Polar Oceans Governance in
a Warming World, RECIEL 16 (2007), 196,215.
196 Timo Koivurova/ErikJ. Molenaar, International Governance and Regulation of the Marine
Arctic: A Proposal for a Legally Binding Instrument, WWF International Arctic Programme (2010).
197 Douglas M. Johnston, The Future of the Arctic Ocean: Competing Domains in International
Public Policy, Ocean Yearbook 17 (2003) 596, 616.
198 Oran R. Young, Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, Polar
Record 45, Issue 1 (2009), 73,79.
199 While representatives did not specifically refer to the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention, the
Convention largely codifies the law of the sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 De-
cember 1982, UNTS 1833,3 (UNCLOS).
200 Representatives further emphasised that there was no need to develop a new comprehensive
international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean, Ilulissat Declaration, 28 May 2008, available at:
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2011).
201 Art. 87 UNCLOS.
202 Art. 157 UNCLOS.
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activities.203 Various responsibilities would fall upon States to control activities of
their vessels and nationals on the high seas, for example, their duty to: conserve fish
stocks204 and to cooperate with other States in seeking to manage fish stocks jointly
exploited;205 undertake environmental impact assessments for planned activities, that
may cause substantial pollution or significant and harmful changes to the marine en-
vironment;206 and generally to protect and preserve the marine environment.207
The role of the Arctic Council in addressing future governance arrangements for
ABNJ in the Arctic Ocean remains uncertain with at least three main approaches
possible. First, a 'reactive approach' could be followed whereby Arctic States would
forestall law and policy responses until actual development pressures arise, such as
proposed commercial fisheries in parts of the ABNJ. Second, a 'global first' strategy
could be followed where Arctic States defer addressing ABNJ issues in the Arctic
until after global discussions and processes result in clarifications as to legal prin-
ciples208 and consensus on the appropriate international legal framework applicable
to ocean areas beyond national jurisdiction.209 Third, Arctic States could follow a
'proactive approach' with various steps taken under the Arctic Council umbrella,
203 Art. 92 UNCLOS.
204 Art. 117 UNCLOS.
205 Art. 118 UNCLOS.
206 Art. 206 UNCLOS.
207 Art. 192 UNCLOS.
208 A major principled debate among States continues over whether marine genetic resources beyond
national jurisdiction should be subject to the common heritage of mankind principle or considered as
one of the freedoms of the high seas, see, e.g., David Leary, International Law and the Genetic Resources
of the Deep Sea, in: Davor Vidas (ed.), Law, Technology and Science for Oceans in Globalization: IUU
Fishing, Oil Pollution, Bioprospecting, Outer Continental Shelf (2010), 353, 361-367; and Harlan
Cohen, Some Reflections on Bioprospecting in the Polar Regions, in: id,, 339, 351.
209 Yjjg nee(j for an implementation agreement on high seas marine biodiversity is subject to ongoing
debate and the ad hoc Open-ended Informed Working Group to study issues relating to the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ WG) has
held four meetings without resolving differing national views. At its last meeting in June 2011, the
Working Group did make some progress on the procedural front in recommending that the UN
General Assembly initiate a process for identifying gaps and ways forward in addressing marine bio-
diversity issues beyond national jurisdiction including through the implementation of existing instru-
ments and the possible development of a multilateral agreement under UNCLOS. The process would
take place within the ABNJ WG and through intersessional workshops, see Letter dated 30 June 2011
from the Co-Chairs of the ad hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to the President of the General
Assembly, UN Doc A/66/119 (2011), 2.
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such as: convening a workshop or workshops to discuss the preferred policy future;210
engaging non-Arctic States and actors in understanding their governance perspec-
tives;211 establishing a task force to review law and policy options; and encouraging a
precautionary moratorium on future commercial living marine resource exploitations
until appropriate scientific and management parameters are in place.212
D. Strengthening the 'Arctic Voice' in International Fora
Many of the environmental threats to the Arctic arise largely from outside the
region and an ongoing challenge is to translate the seriousness of Arctic human and
environmental stresses into effective law and policy responses particularly at the global
level.213 While AMAP assessments have been influential in the negotiation of agree-
ments relating to chemicals214 and heavy metals,215 the ability for the Arctic Council
to push a strong environmental agenda in global fora, besides the IMO, has been weak
to non-existent. For example, adequate climate change mitigation responses, reflecting
the serious Arctic consequences of melting ice and rising temperatures, have yet to be
forged under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).216
210 Various futures might be envisioned including commercialisation, preservation and conservation.
21' On the need for greater engagement with the European Union in particular see Timo Koivurova
eta.1., The Present and Future Competence of the European Union in the Arctic, Polar Record (2011),
available on CJO 2011doi:10.1017/S0032247411000295.
212 For such a precautionary approach suggestion see The Aspen Institute, The Shared Future: A
Report of the Aspen Institute Commission on Arctic Climate Change (2011), 5, available at: http://
www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/Aspen_Climate_Change_Report_2011.
pdf (accessed on 23 November 2011).
213 VanderZwaag/Huebert/Ferrara (note 1); Young (note 19), 334.
214 See David L. Downie/Terry Fenge (eds.), Northern Lights Against POPs: Combating Toxic
Threats in the Arctic (2003).
215 For example, AMAP mercury assessments have fed into the decision of the UN Environmental
Programme Governing Council in 2009 to develop a global legally binding instrument on mercury and
subsequent negotiations with a goal of a final agreement in 2013. UNEP, The Negotiating Process,
available at: http://www.unep.org/hazardoussubstances/Mercury/Negotiations/tabid/3320/Default.
aspx (accessed on 24 August 2011).
216 At the Nuuk meeting, Ministers merely confirmed the commitment of all Arctic States to work
together and with other countries to implement the agreements reached in Cancun by the next climate
talks in Durban, South Africa, and urged all parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 9 May 1992, UNTS 1771, 107 (UNFCCC) to take urgent action to meet the long-
term goal of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2° above pre-industrial levels,
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In light of the large number of chemicals being found in the Arctic with bioaccumu-
lation potential which are not subject to international controls, there is a need to
consider more proactive approaches to chemicals management.217
The Council's Arctic Ocean Review project holds considerable promise to help
mobilise an Arctic Council agenda for taking action at the global and regional levels
to better protect Arctic communities and their environment. The Phase II report
expected to be published in 2013 has the development of options to strengthen inter-
national agreements and measures as one of its major aims.218
However, it remains to be seen how influential the AOR report and implementa-
tion follow-ups will be. Final AOR recommendations are expected to be negotiated
by representatives of the eight Arctic States. As a consensus-based, discussion forum,
the Arctic Council is limited by the political views and sensitivities of its eight Mem-
ber States and reaching consensus on a common voice may be difficult. Furthermore,
it is Member States that are parties to international agreements and possess member-
ship in international organisations, not the Arctic Council itself.
Conceptualising how the Council might best find ways to make the voice of the
Arctic heard in international settings is difficult.219 Suggestions have included the
establishment of an International Cooperation Working Group or a coordinating
committee for external relations220 and a joint working group on the voice of the
Arctic among key partners.221
Nuuk Declaration (note 83), 4. On the inadequacy of mitigation efforts see Meinhard Doelle, The
Climate Change Regime and the Arctic Region, in: Koivurova/Keskitalo/Bankes (note 19), 27.
217 For a recent review of more precautionary ways forward including the possibility of a global
reverse listing approach where only chemicals on a 'safe list' would be allowed to be produced and
marketed, see David L. VanderZwaag, The Precautionary Approach and the International Control of
Toxic Chemicals: Beacon of Hope, Sea of Confusion and Dilution, Houston Journal of International
Law 33 (2011), 605.
218 FAME (note 167), 26.
219 Young (note 14), 13.
220 Koivurova (note 1); VanderZwaag/Huebert/Ferrara (note 1), 177.
221 Partners might include the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, the Executive Committee of the
Northern Forum and Senior Arctic Officials of the Arctic Council, Young (note 14), 18.
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Arctic Council Communication and Outreach Guidelines, adopted at the Nuuk
Ministerial meeting in 2011, may assist to some extent.222 These Guidelines give the
SAO Chair the key role of disseminating information and appearing at conferences,
seminars and meetings of international organisations in order to increase the profile
of the Arctic Council. However, in communication on behalf of the Arctic Council,
the Chair is to confine comments to factual information and agreed positions. When
faced with inquiries to which a common position cannot be obtained, the Chair must
make it clear that any communication made is on behalf of the Chairmanship and
not the Council.223
IV. Conclusion
After fifteen years of existence, the Arctic Council, often criticised for its soft law
status and structural limitations,224 certainly has evolved from being just a 'study and
talk' venue to a policy shaping and even law-making forum. The Arctic Marine Ship-
ping Assessment represented a significant shift with its seventeen recommendations
leading to concrete follow-up actions at the global, regional and national levels.225 The
use of task forces to actually negotiate instrument texts under the auspices of the
Council has become an innovation with a Search and Rescue Agreement concluded
in May 2011 and a further instrument on regional emergency preparedness and
response under development.
A sea of governance challenges still confronts the Arctic Council. Those challenges
include: full implementation of existing commitments and recommendations; com-
pleting the Council's restructuring; addressing future ocean governance of areas
beyond national jurisdictions; and strengthening the influence of Arctic perspectives
in international fora.
222 Arctic Council, Report on Communication and Outreach Guidelines, 21 March 2011, available
at: http://arctic-council.npolar.no/en/meetings/2011-nuuk-ministerial/docs/ (accessed on 2 November
2011).
223 Ibid., 1.
224 Koivurova (note 1).
225 Arctic Council (note 98).
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An apt phrase that captures the essence of how the Arctic Council is faring after
fifteen years is 'a work in progress". The Council continues to flexibly and incre-
mentally evolve on many fronts through task forces, assessments, reviews, expert
groups, work-plans and other plans.226 Many issues have yet to be addressed by the
Council, including bioprospecting and geoengineering,227 and harmonised national
regulatory approaches have yet to be forged particularly in the area of oil and gas
regulation. Whether the Council will be able to adequately stem the powerful tides of
climate change and globalisation has yet to be answered.
226 On the innovative and flexible nature of the Arctic Council with regulatory arrangements being
developed as needed see Oran R. Young, Whither the Arctic 2009? Further Developments, Polar Record
45, Issue 2 (2009), 179; and Young (note 19), 333.
227 See Bj0rnarEgede-Nissen/Hemy David Venema, Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Advanc-
ing the Geoengineering Debate at the Arctic Council, August 2009, available at: http://www.iisd.org/
pdf/2009/desperate_times_desperate_measures.pdf (accessed on 23 November 2011).
